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Abstract:  
This paper aims for a more robust epistemological disjunctivism (ED) by offering 
on its behalf a new and better response to the ‘new evil genius’ problem. The first 
section articulates the ‘new evil genius challenge’ (NEG challenge) to ED, 
specifying its two components: the ‘first-order’ and ‘diagnostic’ problems for ED. 
The first-order problem challenges proponents of ED to offer some understanding 
of the intuition behind the thought that your radically deceived duplicate is no less 
justified than you are for adopting her perceptual beliefs. In the second section, I 
argue that blamelessness explanations are inadequate to the task and offer better 
explanations in their place—that of ‘trait-level virtue’ and ‘reasonability’. The 
diagnostic problem challenges proponents of ED to explain why it is that classical 
internalists disagree with them about how to interpret new evil genius 
considerations. The proponent of ED owes some error theory. I engage this 
problem in the third section, arguing that classical internalists are misled to 
overlook disjunctivist interpretations of new evil genius thinking owing to a 
mistaken commitment to a kind of ‘vindicatory’ explanation of proper perceptual 
belief. 
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1 Disjunctivism and the ‘New Evil Genius’ 
 
1.1 
 
Epistemological disjunctivism (ED) conceives of perceptual knowledge as 
essentially grounded in evidential support that is both factive and reflectively 
accessible. In at least paragon cases, when it ‘looks’ to you as if p because you are 
perceiving that p, you have evidence for thinking that p, which is furnished by your 
very seeing that p to be the case.1 Since by stipulation seeing that p is both factive 
and reflectively accessible, ED is thought to represent the ‘holy grail’ of 
epistemology—seemingly incorporating both internalist and externalist insights 
while avoiding the pitfalls of each (Pritchard 2012, 1). 
For consider that if perceptual knowledge is in virtue of epistemic support 
which is reflectively accessible, then there’s scope for the idea that knowledge 
involves a kind of responsible or non-negligent believing. It’s hard to make sense of 
the thought that one can be properly criticized for accepting a belief if the ‘good-
making’ features of one’s belief are never ‘within view’ for the subject. Indeed, you 
might think that ED depicts perceptual knowledge as responsible believing par 
excellence, since in the best cases one accepts the belief that p for the reason that 
one sees that p. And who is more responsible in conducting one’s doxastic affairs 
than one who accepts some belief on the basis of a consideration that doesn’t still 
leave it open that what one believes might be false? Remarkably, none of this is 
purchased at the cost of even remotely attenuating the ‘truth-connection’ between 
what one believes and its epistemic support. This is because ‘seeing that p’ is 
factive, entailing the truth of the target belief. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1"This"is"the"view"defended"by"Pritchard"(2011,"2012,"forthcoming),"McDowell"(1995,"1998,"2002),"
and"Millar"(2011,"2014)."There"are"nice"distinctions"between"these"‘brands’"of"disjunctivism."For"
instance,"Pritchard"and"McDowell"argue"for"a"kind"of"knowledge)epistemological"disjunctivism—
arguing"for"a"view"about"what"knowledge)is"(such"is"constituted"by"a"perceptual"belief"enjoying"
factive"rational"support,"furnished"by"one’s"seeing"that"p)."Millar,"on"the"other"hand,"argues"for"a"
kind"of"justification)epistemological"disjunctivism—arguing"for"a"view"about"what"perceptual"
justification"is."Millar"thinks"that"while"perceptual"knowledge"need"not"be"constituted"by"any"
‘believing"for"a"reason’"relation,"nevertheless"such"knowledge"provides)one"with"excellent"reason"
to"‘retain’"one’s"perceptual"beliefs."
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So ED stakes its claim to internalism by virtue of advocating for evidential 
support that is accessible2 to the subject by simple reflection upon its situation.3  
But while ‘internalist’ in this respect, ED is not ‘traditionally’ internalist. No 
advocate of classical internalism would accept it. For classical internalism is marked 
by a kind of internalism about evidence. Evidential internalism holds that a person 
shares all her evidence with any non-factive mental state duplicate of hers.4 For 
example, the evidence you have now for thinking that there’s a hand in front of you 
is the same you would have if you were now only tricked into thinking this, because 
you were a brain in a vat, say.5 Perhaps your evidence is your ‘seeming to see that p’ 
or something to that effect. 
But ED is defined in objection to this thesis. For so long as your evidence 
includes the fact that you see that p, you have evidence not available to every non-
factive mental state duplicate of yours. For some of these folks just hallucinate all 
the time, merely seeming to see that p whenever you see that p. The result is that 
you will differ from them in the evidence you have. You won’t have the same 
evidence. By thus advocating for factive evidential support in ‘good cases’, ED 
adopts a kind of evidential externalism. It’s owing to its evidentially externalist 
element that ED qualifies as a kind of non-classical internalism about epistemic 
support. 
Indeed, this evidentially externalist aspect of ED can be reconceptualised for 
appreciating the view’s distinctly disjunctive aspect: in cases where it perceptually !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2"Following"Conee"and"Feldman"(2000)"we"might"conceive"of"‘cognitive"access’"as"neutral"between"
more"specific"forms"of"internalist"access,"such"as"those"described"by"mentalism)and"accessibilism)
in"epistemology."Surely"by"‘reflective"access’"Pritchard"means"to"wed"ED"to"a"kind"of"accessibilism,"
as"is"evident"in"his"(2011)."But"it"remains"unclear"whether"a"mentalist"rendering"of"ED"cannot"
generate"every"advantage"Pritchard"argues"for"in"(2012)."
"
3"Although"generally"more"enigmatic"on"the"specifics"of"ED,"John"McDowell"(2002,"280)"betrays"
‘internalist’"sentiments"when"he"writes"that"“when"one"sees"how"things"are"[…]"a"warrant"and"
cause"for"one’s"belief"that"things"are"that"way"is"visibly"there)for"one"in"the"bit"of"reality"that"is"
within"one’s"view”,"and"that"in"such"cases"one’s"epistemic"support"is"not"external"to"what"is"
“available”"to"one"from"one’s"“present"angle"on"reality”."
"
4"Silins"(2005,"376)"writes"that"evidential"internalists"think"that"“necessarily,"if"A"and"B"are"internal"
twins,"then"A"and"B"have"the"same"evidence”.""
"
5"That’s"not"to"say"that"classical"internalists"need"think"that"the"support"your"evidence"lends"in"
both"cases"is"the"same."For"proponents"of"classical"internalism"who"think"it"is"the"same"see"Conee"
and"Feldman"(2000,"2008)"and"Dougherty"(2014)."For"others"who"think"it"isn’t"see"‘evidentialist"
reliabilists’"like"Goldman"(2011),"Comesaña"(2010),"and"Alston"(1988)."
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looks to one as if p, one’s evidence for p is either that one sees that p or that one 
only seemingly sees that p—depending upon one’s case. One’s evidence in the 
‘good case’ is thus of a better kind than what one has in the ‘bad case’, despite the 
fact that each case is introspectively indistinguishable from the other. 
 
1.2  
 
The ‘old’ evil genius problem is a problem for classical internalism—and trades on 
a peculiar thought the view allows, viz., that the best evidential support you ever 
have for your perceptual beliefs is what you would have anyway, even if you were 
radically deceived. The ‘new’ evil genius problem6 is a problem for certain views 
wishing to avoid the old problem. One such view is a kind of ‘reliabilism’ about 
justification—a belief is justified only if it’s produced by some ‘reliable’ cognitive 
faculty.7  
Since you are a thoroughly unreliable cognitive instrument in worlds that 
seem ordinary although you are a victim of an evil genius, reliabilism about 
justification entails that the beliefs you form in these circumstances are not 
justified. 
But you might think it’s apparent that such beliefs are justified. For instance, 
is it not apparent that, if you were radically deceived, you would have every reason 
you have in the actual world for holding these beliefs? This is the new evil genius 
problem. Applied to reliabilism about justification, the reliabilist has the problem of 
explaining the compelling thought that your radically deceived non-factive mental 
state duplicate’s beliefs are no less justified than yours. 
ED similarly faces a new evil genius problem.8 For you might have thought 
that the straightforward explanation why your radically deceived counterpart is no 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6!See"Cohen"and"Lehrer"(1983)."
"
7"See"Goldman"(1979)."
"
8"I"should"add"that"the"new"evil"genius"problem"is"not"only)a"problem"for"disjunctivists,"but"for"
any)evidential"externalist."Any"proponent"of"E=K"(see"footnote"29)"faces"this"problem,"such"as"
Williamson"(2000)"and"Littlejohn"(2015,"forthcomingA,"forthcomingB),"as"does"someone"like"
Schellenberg"(2015);"and"perhaps"even"evidentialist"reliabilists"like"Goldman"(2011),"Comesaña"
(2010),"and"Alston"(1988)."
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less justified than you for holding her beliefs is that she has every reason you have 
to hold them, or she has all of your relevant evidence. You might thus be lead to 
accept the ‘new evil genius thesis’ (NEG)9: that the evidence one has in the ‘good 
case’ is not better than the evidence one has in the corresponding ‘bad case’.10 
ED rejects this on a matter of principle. This is because ED holds that one’s 
perceptual evidence is better—much better—in the good case than it is in the bad 
case.11 After all in the good case you have available to you that you see that p, a bit 
of information incompatible with the falsity of what you believe. This is unlike a 
mere ‘seeming seeing’12 that p, a bit of information you would have anyway even if 
nothing you thought about the world were true.13 
But if ED is going to reject NEG—the idea that the evidence available to 
you in the bad case is just as good as the evidence you have in the good case—, then 
it has some explaining to do. More specifically, ED should have on offer some !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9"In"what"follows"I"use"the"‘NEG"thesis’"interchangeably"with"‘evidential"internalism’."But"in"fact"
these"notions"express"logically"distinct"ideas."Evidential"internalism"entails)the"NEG"thesis,"but"
the"entailment"doesn’t"work)in"the"opposite"direction."For"if"your"evidence"is"the"same)as"
someone"else’s,"it"follows"that"your"evidence"can"be"no"better"(which"is"not"to"say"that"the"support)
such"evidence"offers"can"be"no"better)."But"it"might"be"true"that"your"evidence"is"no"better"than"
someone"else’s,"even"though"your"evidence"is)different"(or"not"the"same).""
"
10"There"may"be"some"proponents"of"classical"internalism"who"are"unhappy"about"this"
characterization"of"the"NEG"thesis,"in"so"far"as"it’s"meant"to"reflect"a"commitment"of"theirs."In"
particular,"some"may"not"like"its"being"spelled"out"in"terms"of"evidence."I’ll"say"two"things"in"
response."First,"for"the"purpose"of"this"project"nothing"hangs"on"any"detailed"conception"of"
evidence."Following"Conee"and"Feldman"(2008,"88),"by"‘evidence’"I"just"mean"something"like"‘the"
information"or"data"the"person"has"to"go"on"in"forming"her"beliefs’."Secondly,"though,"in"any"case,"
there"doesn’t"appear"to"be"any"unified"conception"of"NEG"in"the"literature."For"example,"where"I"
am"choosing"‘evidence’"to"describe"this"commitment"of"classical"internalism,"Silins"(2005,"375)"
chooses"the"same;"Pritchard"chooses"‘internalist"epistemic"support’"in"one"place"(2012,"38)"and"
‘rational"support’"in"another"(forthcoming,)chapter"2,"24);"Turri"(2009,"493)"seems"to"be"thinking"
of"‘reasons"for"belief’,"and"Cohen"and"Lehrer"(1983,"192–193)"in"terms"of"justification."
"
11"Note"that"it’s"logically"possible"for"subjects"A"and"B"to"differ)in"available"evidence,"and"yet"
neither"is"in"any"better"evidential"position"than"the"other."
"
12"‘Seeming"seeing’"is"John"McDowell’s"label"for"one’s"perceptual"experiences"when"it"looks"to"one"
as"if"p,"but"it’s"not"a"case"of"p)making"itself"visually"manifest"to"one,"or"else"it’s"not"a"case"of"one’s"
seeing"that"p."See"McDowell’s"(2013)"presentation"at"University"College"Dublin:"“Can"Cognitive"
Science"Determine"Epistemology?”"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m8y8673RmII."
"
13"There"are"no"few"advantages"to"be"won"if"disjunctivism"is"true."For"example"Pritchard"(2012)"
argues"that"disjunctivism"secures"a"very"satisfying"solution"to"underdeterminationkbased"radical"
skeptical"problems;"McDowell"(1995)"seems"to"argue"that"disjunctivism"secures"against)a"sort"of"
firstkperson"knowledgekundermining"‘reflective"luck’"concerning"our"beliefs"about"the"external"
world;"and"Millar"(2012)"has"argued"that"disjunctivism"secures"for"knowledge"a"particular"role:"
that"of"clinching"an"answer"to"a"particular"question,"or"of"justifying"a"close"of"inquiry."
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alternative explanation for NEG-engendering intuitions. If we don’t think that you 
and your radically deceived duplicate are equally justified because you have all the 
same evidence, well then why do we think this at all? Why are philosophers prone 
to think that a good case subject and her radically deceived counterpart share in 
some measure of justification or positive epistemic status if this does not amount to 
sameness of evidential support?  
Firstly, then, ED owes some account of this situation consistent with its 
brand of evidential externalism—consistent with the fact that you have much better 
evidence than does your radically deceived counterpart. This is the first-order 
problem for ED. But then, secondly, the most robust account of ED will also 
provide some error theory. It will offer some diagnosis for why proponents of 
classical internalism are prone to adopt evidential internalism in light of new evil 
genius thinking, and why this is mistaken. This is the diagnostic problem for ED.14 
The first-order problem and the diagnostic problem comprise the new evil 
genius challenge for epistemological disjunctivism (NEG challenge). This paper 
aims to offer a better disjunctivist response to the NEG challenge than any to date. 
The paper is divided into two further sections—each handling one aspect of the 
NEG challenge. 
The first section tackles the first-order problem. If it’s not the case that you 
and your radically deceived counterpart adopt your perceptual beliefs on account of 
the same evidence, what should the disjunctivist say about this situation so as to 
play fair with the NEG intuition that your radically deceived duplicate’s beliefs are 
no less justified than yours? 
The second section tackles the diagnostic problem. Why after all are 
epistemologists compelled to accept evidential internalism in light of new evil 
genius considerations and why should this compulsion be resisted? Why is the 
proponent of classical internalism prone to overlook disjunctivist explanations of 
new evil genius considerations?  
 
  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14"Thanks"to"an"anonymous"referee"for"helping"me"to"keep"clear"these"two"distinct"problems."
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2 Disjunctivism and the First-order Problem  
 
2.1 
 
How should the disjunctivist engage the first-order problem, then? What should 
the disjunctivist say about your perceptual belief and that of your radically deceived 
counterpart so as to play fair with the thought that their belief is no less justified 
than yours—despite the fact that you have much better evidence? 
Let us first get clear about the thought at issue in the first-order problem—
the thought that compels proponents of classical internalism to adopt the NEG 
thesis.  
In this connection Madison (2014, 66) writes that when considering a good-
case subject and her radically deceived counterpart “internalists point out the 
intuitive plausibility of holding that the counterparts are equally justified in 
believing as they do: their beliefs are justified to the very same extent, sharing 
sameness of justificatory status”. 
I’m going to suggest that this thought be cashed out in terms of ‘sameness of 
epistemic status’—rather than ‘justification’. I think Williamson (forthcoming, 3) is 
right that “epistemic justification is manifestly technical terminology” and that “we 
should be correspondingly suspicious of claims to make pre-theoretic judgments 
about its application.” I don’t mean to suggest that ‘epistemic status’ is any kind of 
natural language equivalent to ‘justification’. Rather I mean it to stand as a kind of 
place-holder term—indicating “whatever it is that is shared between your beliefs 
and those of your radically deceived duplicate, which drives some of us to think that 
both are equally justified”.15 
Here is our formulation of the thought behind the new evil genius intuition: 
when considering a good case subject’s belief and that of her radically deceived 
counterpart, we are struck with the thought that both subjects are equal with 
respect to some grade of positive epistemic status, some normative quality relevant 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15"Thanks"very"much"to"an"anonymous"referee"for"helping"me"to"clarify"this"use"of"‘epistemic"
status’."
! 8!
to the aims of truth-seeking. Call this the sameness of epistemic status intuition 
(SOSI).16 
From SOSI the classical internalist is instructed that the epistemic 
counterparts in question share in evidential support for their beliefs. They think 
that each have the very same “information to go on” in forming their beliefs, or else 
that this is the “best explanation” or “lesson to be drawn” from SOSI (Madison 
2014, 67). In other words, they adopt NEG as the best explanation for SOSI. 
But the disjunctivist cannot opt for this explanation on pains of giving up her 
position. ED is essentially committed to there being a radical difference between 
the evidence a person has in a good case and that which she has in the 
corresponding bad case. For in good cases one’s perceptual belief is evidentially 
supported by one’s seeing that p, despite the fact that one’s deceived counterpart’s 
belief is at best supported by its mere ‘seeming seeing’ that p.  
Therefore ED must offer some alternative understanding of SOSI, one 
that’s consistent with the counterpart subject’s differing in evidential support. The 
disjunctivist might think to invoke some form of blamelessness for this purpose.17 I 
think she must do better—as I’ll argue in the next subsection. 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16"You"might"wonder"at"this"point"whether"SOSI"concerns"a"sort"of"epistemic"property"concerning"
beliefs)or"believers."And"you"might"further)think"that"the"answer"to"this"question"should"be"‘readk
off’"an"articulation"of"SOSI"itself."I"think"this"is"a"mistake."Whether"the"epistemic"properties"one"
shares"with"her"radically"deceived"counterpart"are"properties"of"herself)or"of"her"beliefs)is"a"matter"
to"be"decided"through"argument"and"weighing"of"principles—not"settled"by"appeal"to"brute"
intuition.""
"
17"This"strategy"is"adopted"by"Duncan"Pritchard"in"his"(2012,"42):"“[…]"epistemological"
disjunctivists"are"[not]"obliged"to"argue"that"there"isn’t"an"internalist"epistemic"standing"which"is"
common"to"both"the"subject"and"her"envatted"duplicate."In"particular,"it"is"widely"noted"about"the"
subjects"in"the"new"evil"genius"example"that"one"epistemic"standing"they"share"is"that"they"are"
equally"blameless)in"believing"as"they"do.”"John"McDowell"(2002,"99)"thinks"similarly."Of"someone"
who"is"tricked"with"mirrors"into"thinking"that"there’s"a"candle"in"front"of"her,"he"writes"that"“it"
might"be"rational"(doxastically"blameless)"for"that"subject—who"only"seems"to"see"a"candle"in"
front"of"her—to"claim"that"there"is"a"candle"in"front"of"her"[emphasis"added].”"Williamson"(2014,"
5)"puts"it"in"terms"of"excuse:"“Although"your"belief"that"you"have"hands"is"fully"justified,"the"
corresponding"brain"in"a"vat’s"belief"is"not."But"the"brain"in"a"vat"has)a)good)excuse"for"believing"
that"it"has"hands,"because,"for"all"it"knows,"its"belief"that"it"has"hands"is"justified,"since,"for"all"it"
knows,"it"knows"that"it"has"hands."Confusion"between"justification"and"excuses"undermines"much"
talk"of"epistemic"justification"[emphasis"added].”""
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2.2 
 
You are strolling along the beachfront and notice a moored sailboat. You thereby 
come to believe that there’s a ship at harbour. So does your radically deceived non-
factive mental state duplicate. If it’s not the fact that the two of you share the same 
evidence that explains the thought that there’s something epistemically that’s the 
same about both of your believings, then what? What explains the thought 
ensconced in SOSI?  
Perhaps the sameness of epistemic status at issue between you and your 
radically deceived counterpart is that of general blamelessness. Your radically 
deceived counterpart invites no more impunity than you do, nor is any less above 
reproach, for believing as she does. Is this what the disjunctivist should say? 
I don’t think so. General blamelessness is unfit for what the disjunctivist 
needs. SOSI, after all, concerns sameness of epistemic status between the good case 
subject and her radically deceived counterpart. When considering these subjects, 
we are struck with the thought that the two share some positive evaluative status 
relevant to attaining the truth. But it’s not at all clear how one’s being exempt from 
any sort of general blame amounts to an epistemic evaluation of subjects—one 
relevant to the aims, say, of obtaining truth and avoiding error on a matter. 
This is plausibly the reason why current advocates18 of disjunctivism (or 
other knowledge-first type views) propose epistemic blamelessness. They propose 
that your radically deceived counterpart deserves no more epistemic blame than 
you do for having believed as they did. 
Here’s a problem concerning epistemic blamelessness insofar as it’s meant to 
shed light on SOSI. ‘Blamelessness’ is an inherently deontic notion—of a piece with 
‘obligation’ and related notions of duty fulfilment. It’s plausible that only if subjects 
are in fact bound to epistemic duties and obligations that it even makes sense to 
attribute to them statuses like epistemic blamelessness. But surely someone who 
abjured the existence of epistemic obligations or duties might still find it 
compelling that there’s some epistemic status enjoyed in common between a 
subject and her radically deceived counterpart. If epistemic blamelessness was the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18"Refer"to"footnote"17."
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status at issue in SOSI—if this is why we thought that your deceived counterpart 
was no less justified than you in her beliefs—then someone would have to be 
confused to reject epistemic obligations and nevertheless find SOSI compelling. 
But that just seems wrong. Surely one can think that there’s some shared epistemic 
status between ordinary subjects and their radically deceived counterparts without 
needing to commit to the existence of epistemic duties.   
Moreover, recent work in this area has suggested even further reason to be 
suspicious about the adequacy of epistemic blamelessness for understanding the 
sameness of status at issue between you and your radically deceived counterpart. 
Following Madison (2014), we might consider comparing our radically deceived 
counterparts not with ourselves—but with other kinds of epistemic unfortunates.  
Madison is broadly interested to defend evidentially internalist explanations 
of SOSI against alternative externalist explanations seeking to invoke epistemic 
blamelessness. But his more modest goal is to put something of a stone in the 
disjunctivist’s shoe. Madison argues that sameness of epistemic blamelessness is ill 
equipped for understanding the epistemic status that is held in common between 
subjects and their radically deceived counterparts. To this end Madison asks us to 
consider Al, Al*, Bert, and Carl. 
Al and Al* are our good case and bad case counterparts respectively, who 
both believe there to be a ship at harbour at least because they both take themselves 
to see that there’s a ship at harbour. Poor Bert has been horribly brainwashed such 
that he also believes there to be a ship at harbour, but for unspecified reasons to do 
with his brainwashing. Finally Carl is your typical brain-lesion victim who believes 
that there’s a ship at harbour because he has smelt freshly cut grass. (The 
implication throughout is that only Al enjoys a true belief, but this is immaterial for 
Madison’s purposes). 
 
Al: good case subject in ordinary circumstances. 
Al*: bad case counterpart, who is radically deceived. 
Bert: brainwashed victim. 
Carl: brain-lesion victim, who believes because he smells freshly cut grass.  
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Madison notes that all four subjects share the same belief and are all above 
reproach, or are epistemically blameless, for believing as they do. But crucially is 
there not something more epistemically to be said of Al’s and Al*’s believing, which 
cannot be said of either Bert or Carl? Specifically, Madison writes: 
 
While all are blameless in believing as they do, surely Al and Al* have better 
rational support for their beliefs than Bert or Carl do: they hold their beliefs 
on the basis of evidence which they take to support the truth of what is 
believed, whereas Bert and Carl do not. (2014, 68) 
 
Madison takes these comparative judgments to mitigate against the plausibility of 
suggesting that “mere blamelessness is what the internalist confuses for justification 
in the demon world” (2014, 68). Rather, as the thought experiment indicates, Al 
and Al* both enjoy a sort of superior epistemic standing of which Bert and Carl 
don’t—a more robust epistemic status going beyond mere epistemic blamelessness.  
If the disjunctivist were to insist that both Al and Al* are only merely 
epistemically blamelessness in believing as they do, she would be left without 
concepts for making the relevant distinctions between Al*, Bert, and Carl. If the 
best evaluation one can offer Al* is that of believing blamelessly, then one’s at a loss 
for distinctions to put him in a better light than his brainwashed and lesion-
suffering friends—contrary to intuition. 
Given these data it’s plausible that SOSI reflects a stronger kind of epistemic 
agreement between Al and Al*, beyond that of mere epistemic blamelessness.19 
A more satisfying response to the first-order question comprising the NEG 
challenge should avoid these two difficulties. It shouldn’t suggest that one cannot 
be moved by the thought ensconced in SOSI without substantive commitments in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19"A"disjunctivist"proponent"of"the"blamelessness"understanding"of"SOSI"might"bulk"at"the"
suggestion"that"this"thought"experiment"goes"to"support"evidential"internalism"(and"thus"NEG)."
After"all,"to"judge"that"both"Al"and"Al*"enjoy"some"form"of"rational"or"evidential"support"for"their"
beliefs,"whereas"Bert"and"Carl"do"not,"is"consistent"with"Al"and"Al*"enjoying"different)evidence—
indeed"even"radically"different"kinds—a"thesis"incompatible"with"evidential"internalism."After"all,"
the"disjunctivist"need"not"be"committed"to"the"view"that"radically"deceived"subjects"enjoy"no"
evidential"support"at"all."But"again,"Madison’s"goals"are"more"modest."He"is"not"aiming"at"a"
defense)of"classical"internalism."Rather"he’s"putting"pressure"on"the"disjunctivist"thought"that"it’s"
merely"blamelessness)that"Al"and"Al*"share."
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epistemic deontology; and it should furnish materials sufficient for understanding 
how subjects like Al and Al* host beliefs which are better poised epistemically than 
those hosted by subjects such as Bert and Carl. 
 
2.3 
 
I’ve been saying that there’s some positive epistemic status that’s the same about 
your basic perceptual belief and that of your radically deceived counterpart. For 
example, it seems that Al and Al* enjoy in equal measure some grade of positive 
epistemic evaluation. 
But, classical internalist thinking notwithstanding, it can’t be that these two 
subjects share in available evidence. Not if ED is true. But then ED owes some 
understanding of SOSI consistent with the idea that Al and Al* differ in terms of 
their available evidence. Mere epistemic blamelessness is inadequate for this 
purpose for the considerations just explored. How else might the disjunctivist 
respond to the first-order question concerning what to say about subjects such as Al 
and Al*? 
Consider first that while it’s good that a belief be based on sufficient 
evidence, or that it be believed for the good reasons one has, it’s also good that a 
belief be produced out of a virtuous character, or by an epistemically virtuous 
person. Such epistemic character traits are the focus of virtue responsibilists. Virtue 
responsibilism (see Zagzebski 1996) is typically distinguished from virtue 
reliabilism. While reliabilists conceive of epistemic virtues as seated in reliable 
cognitive faculties or mechanisms or skills, responsibilists would have virtue seated 
in acquired and enduring traits of character, or person-level dispositions of 
motivation and (epistemically relevant) action.20 
As Battaly (2008, 645) notes, “responsibilists differ over whether virtues 
require reliability”. But if you think that reliability is unnecessary for responsibilist 
virtue possession, then there’s no reason to think that one loses one’s virtue if 
radically deceived. If reliability is merely optional in this way, then one’s trait-level 
virtue can be held fixed across the situation in which one is radically deceived. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20"For"helpful"commentary"see"Battaly"(2008)."
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Beyond mere epistemic blamelessness, then, the disjunctivist might contend 
that Al and Al* are equally trait-level virtuous in believing as they do. The sameness 
of status which they both enjoy is that of a form of epistemic responsibility—Al* is 
no less trait-level virtuous than Al for believing the very same proposition while 
envatted. 
Now is the claim at issue that both Al and Al* merely possess the same 
virtue, or that they actually exercise such virtue when each comes to believe that 
there’s a ship at harbour? No doubt, I think, that they both possess the same quality 
of trait-level virtue—that each is equally well-disposed with respect to guiding 
himself to the truth—that each ‘loves the truth’ no less than the other. But I also 
want to say that this epistemic virtue is in both cases employed with respect to Al’s 
and Al*’s believing. This is because I think SOSI reflects the thought that both Al 
and Al* share some positive epistemic status with respect to their believing as they 
do. Trait-level epistemic virtue doesn’t look to be adequate for understanding the 
sameness of status at issue in SOSI if it is conceived such that one’s believing bears 
no significant connection with it. Rather, I think that both Al and Al*’s beliefs 
relevantly manifest their trait-level epistemic virtue, or concern for the truth. 
But you might wonder how, more precisely, Al and Al* manifest their 
concern for the truth in believing as they do. Well, very simply, in response to its 
looking as though there’s a ship at harbour, both Al and Al* believe to this effect for 
the consideration that each sees that there’s a ship at harbour. I mean that both 
subjects are motivated to accept their beliefs by considerations that, if true, 
wouldn’t still allow that what each believes may still be false. Consider: who is more 
concerned about the truth as to whether p than the person whose acceptance of p is 
guided by what she takes to be a factive reason in her possession? Since I’m 
assuming reliability to be a non-issue, Al* need be no less virtuous than Al in this 
respect, even though he’s completely unreliable in his circumstances.  
Crucially, that both Al and Al* share in sameness of trait-level virtue is 
consistent with their differing in levels of evidential support—which is just what the 
proponent of ED needs. For why think that Al*’s impeccable epistemic character 
should secure him against thinking falsely that he’s in possession of a factive 
reason? Indeed we might have expected so much from epistemically doomed 
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subjects. Al* is after all in maximally abysmal epistemic conditions. But he need be 
no less concerned for the truth than Al for being tricked into thinking that he 
believes as he does because of his seeing something to be the case, when this is false. 
Al*’s abysmal epistemic circumstances simply lead him to mistake his perceptual 
evidential ground for thinking that there’s a ship at harbour. He thinks it’s his 
seeing that there’s a ship—but it isn’t.  
So in general good case and bad case subjects may possess and exercise their 
trait-level virtue to the same degree in believing, though the deceived subject 
simply mistakes her epistemic ground for something else (i.e. your radically 
deceived counterpart thinks their belief that p is because of their seeing that p, 
when really it’s only something like their seeming to see that p).  
But as we have noted in the previous subsection, trait-level virtue must do 
more than articulate a grade of positive epistemic status shared between Al and Al* 
which is consistent with their differing in evidential support. The epistemic status 
at issue must also illuminate our thinking about Al and Al* with respect to Bert and 
Carl. How then might trait-level virtue serve to epistemically distinguish Al*’s 
believing from that of lesion-suffering Carl?  
 
2.4 
 
It seems that trait-level virtue is successful for distinguishing Al*’s case from Carl’s. 
For consider a paradigm epistemic character trait like conscientiousness (or a kind 
of general concern to believe that p if and only if p). Because Al* is through no fault 
of his own epistemically doomed—suffering as he is in maximally abysmal epistemic 
conditions—no measure of reflective wherewithal or doxastic regulation will secure 
him against thinking that there’s a ship at harbour when there isn’t. Given that 
Al*’s case is introspectively indistinguishable from Al’s, plausibly Al* can exhibit 
conscientiousness as impressively as can be expected while continuing to think 
falsely that there’s a ship at harbour. 
However, the same cannot be said for lesion-suffering Carl. For if Carl did 
manifest the same degree of conscientiousness in believing as Al* believes, then he 
shouldn’t go on thinking that there’s a ship at harbour. 
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If Carl were even remotely conscientious, then upon considering his belief 
that there’s a ship at harbour, he should recognize how irresponsible it would be to 
accept this belief, given his context. Remember, he’s not being visually appeared to 
in the way that goes along with perceiving that there’s a ship at harbour. His belief 
is based solely on his smelling freshly cut grass. To accept this belief in the teeth of 
his circumstances in this way is not to believe out of the same virtuous character as 
that manifested by Al*. 
Unfortunately, though, while sameness of trait-level virtue is sufficient for 
distinguishing Al* from Carl in this way, it’s not so clear that it does as well with 
respect to brainwashed Bert.  
For one can imagine Bert suffering the worst of epistemic upbringings, such 
that his noetic structure is peppered with all manner of false beliefs about how to 
conduct inquiry, and what properly counts as evidence for what. Nevertheless there 
seems no principled reason to think him any less conscientious than Al*, less 
meticulous in gathering what he takes to be evidence, or generally less concerned 
about believing the truth.  
Intuitively though—as Madison highlights—, Al* is epistemically better off 
than Bert. This is not something the disjunctivist can explain if the best epistemic 
status Al* shares with Al is trait-level virtue. 
So the proponent of ED should like to have something in addition to trait-
level virtue which would also capture the intuitive evaluative difference between Al* 
and brainwashed Bert. The first-order problem is not settled yet. 
 
2.5 
 
In addition to enjoying sameness of trait-level responsibility, I suggest that Al and 
Al* enjoy sameness of reasonability in that, as Sutton (2005, 373) has articulated, 
both believe as the reasonable person would believe, where the reasonable person 
“is one whose belief-forming faculties and habits (e.g. inferential habits) are such as 
to deliver knowledge when conditions are right.” 
Both Al and Al* take themselves to see a ship at harbour, believing to this 
effect for the consideration that each sees there to be a ship at harbour. And when 
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conditions are right—as they are for Al, but not Al*—, they get to know 
perceptually that there’s a ship at harbour. 
Such is not the case, however, for poor brainwashed Bert. Even when 
conditions are optimal, Bert’s belief-forming processes and habits do not secure 
knowledge for him, since he doesn’t believe that there’s a ship at harbour on the 
basis of anything that is even remotely truth-conducive (e.g. he believes on the basis 
of wishful thinking, say). As Madison points out, Bert is plausibly not to be blamed 
for this, least because he’s been involuntarily brainwashed. Still, his situation on this 
occasion is not one in which he exercises belief-forming faculties and/or habits such 
that he would know the target belief in normal conditions. Bert’s belief then in this 
sense isn’t reasonable.  
Again, that both Al and Al* are equally reasonable is consistent with their 
differing in evidential support for their beliefs. Al* might mistake the condition of 
his evidence, and this compatibly with his manifesting inferential habits of belief 
formation which are good for yielding knowledge in normal (good) conditions.21  
For both Al and Al* believe that there’s a ship at harbour on the basis of the 
consideration that they see that there’s a ship at harbour. Of course only Al’s 
consideration is also a good (normative) reason he has for thinking that’s there’s a 
ship at harbour, and so comes to know as a result. By contrast Al* doesn’t have the 
good reason he thinks he has—he at best only seems to see a ship at harbour. But, 
again, this is not to say that he’s any less reasonable than Al, despite the fact that his 
beliefs enjoy worse evidential support. After all, when conditions are right for Al*, 
and he believes as he does for this same reason when things look this way to him, he 
gets to know as a result. 
I’m not the first to invoke a conception of reasonability for defending 
disjunctivist-type views in light of the first-order problem. For example, Millar 
(2011, 345) has this to say about one’s belief in the bad case: 
 
So my belief in the bad case is reasonable, in that, roughly speaking, it is a 
belief that a suitably equipped and competent person might well form in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21"The"inferential"habit"in"question"is"something"like"this:"(in"cases"where"whether"or"not"p"is"
important)"when"it"looks"to"Al*"as"if"p,)he"believes"that"p)for"the"reason"that"he"sees"that"p."
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envisaged situation without doxastic irresponsibility. This, or some refined 
version, is the truth behind the intuition [which I’ve called ‘SOSI’]. 
 
You might conceive of the present project as offering such a “refined version”. I 
mean for my discussion to be complementary to what Millar is suggesting here—a 
kind of development of his notion of reasonability.  
For you might think: in what sense, more specifically, is Al* “suitably 
equipped and competent” such that his belief merits a better epistemic evaluation 
than that of brainwashed Bert? Well, Al* understands which are the right 
considerations to have in mind when inferring from one’s situation that there’s a 
ship at harbour. Al* understands that his belief to this effect should be based on his 
seeing that there’s a ship at harbour. Bert doesn’t understand this, because he’s 
been brainwashed into thinking that other considerations merit inference to the 
conclusion that there’s a ship at harbour (perhaps he’s been brainwashed to think 
that he can safely infer this from the consideration that he wishes there was a ship 
at harbour).22 
 
2.6 
 
So it seems to me that beyond mere blamelessness the disjunctivist might have the 
following to say concerning the first-order question, the question about what to say 
of the perceptual beliefs of one’s radically deceived counterpart: your radically 
deceived counterpart is no less trait-level virtuous nor less reasonable than you are 
for believing as you do— this despite the fact that her evidence is much worse. 
This is to make an advance in the story given by disjunctivism regarding 
intuitions proponents of classical internalism take to motivate an incompatible 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22"Millar"(2014,"2)"has"also)had"this"to"say"about"reasonableness:"“The"good"standing"that"the"
notion"of"reasonableness"captures"with"respect"to"a"belief"depends"on"the"subject’s"situation"being"
to"that"subject,"in"the"circumstances,"indistinguishable"from"one"in"which"the"belief"is"wellk
founded.”"Of"course,"Millar"must"have"in"mind"to"restrict"such"subjects"to"those"who"are"“suitably"
equipped"and"competent”,"for"otherwise"brainwashed"Bert’s"perceptual"belief"is"reasonable—for"
from"his"perspective"it"does)seem"as"if"his"perceptual"belief"is"wellkfounded."His"brainwashing"has"
caused"him"to"be"confused"about"what"makes"for"‘wellkfoundedness’"in"cases"of"perceptual"beliefs."
Thanks"to"an"anonymous"referee"for"helping"me"think"through"these"comments"from"Millar,"and"
their"bearing"on"the"current"project."""
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view—viz., evidential internalism. In grappling with the NEG challenge, 
disjunctivists can do better than insist that your radically deceived duplicate is no 
more epistemically blameworthy than you for holding the same beliefs (recall 
problems in 2.2 above). Rather she can say that your radically deceived duplicate 
manifests no less trait-level virtue than you in believing as you do, nor does she 
reveal herself to be any less reasonable. These statuses avoid needless tangles in 
epistemic deontology, are consistent with discrepancies in the available evidence 
and are sufficient for making the correct distinctions between our radically deceived 
counterparts, and other epistemic unfortunates.  
 
2.7 
 
Before moving ahead to address the diagnostic horn of the NEG challenge, I 
should like to address two objections. Firstly, the proponent of classical internalism 
might argue that ED’s evidential externalism is under-motivated in the following 
way: why is the proponent of ED so eager to think that Al*’s evidence must be so 
much worse than Al’s? After all, there are so many other ways to explain why Al*, 
but not Al, lack knowledge.23  
For instance, two subjects might enjoy the same degree of propositional 
justification furnished by the same evidence, yet only one subject knows, because 
the other’s belief is either false, or the belief is not ‘well-founded’ on the evidence, 
or one’s belief is ‘Gettiered’, or suffers some other form of knowledge-undermining 
luck, or etc. 
In other words, since one doesn’t need to assume that Al*’s evidential 
position is less strong than Al’s for understanding why Al* (but not Al) is ignorant, 
you might think there’s insufficient reason for thinking that Al and Al* must differ 
in available evidence on account of the fact that while Al knows, Al* doesn’t. 
In response, this simply misunderstands the motivation behind disjunctivist 
views. No one is arguing for ED (or for any other evidentially externalist position) 
on the grounds that lack of factive evidence is required for explaining one’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23"Thanks"to"Brent"Madison"for"inspiring"the"discussion"to"follow"in"this"subsection."
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ignorance in maximally abysmal epistemic circumstances where one is epistemically 
doomed. Rather ED is argued for on other grounds (see footnote 11). 
But I should like to note another point in this connection that I have found 
under-appreciated in discussions on this issue. In predicting that your radically 
deceived counterpart has worse evidence for her perceptual beliefs than you do, ED 
might be seen to have the advantage over classical internalist positions in the 
following way: given that one is truly in maximally abysmal epistemic conditions, 
should we not expect that one’s ignorance is superlatively over-determined? After 
all these subjects are in the direst, most abysmal epistemic circumstances we can 
imagine. We are not mincing words when we say that such subjects are 
epistemically doomed. One might think then that it’s a strength of a position like 
ED that it accentuates this fact by predicting that such subjects haven’t even a grip 
on their perceptual evidence for thinking the most basic things about the world 
(e.g. that there’s a ship at harbour). Proponents of classical internalism might thus 
be accused of painting epistemological doom as too rosy—maintaining that while 
epistemically doomed subjects are vastly ignorant, at least they are believing in 
accordance with their evidence! 
Secondly, the advocate of classical internalism might object in the following 
way: she might agree with me that Al and Al* are equally trait-level virtuous and/or 
reasonable in the senses I suggest, but nevertheless insist that each also share in 
evidential support for their beliefs. It’s just intuitively obvious, she might say, that 
Al’s evidence is no better than Al*’s. 
Now obviously if it’s a datum that you and your radically deceived 
counterpart share all the same evidence for your perceptual beliefs, then 
disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge is false. But clearly the disjunctivist can 
just deny that this is a datum—or else deny that this is as intuitive as the proponent 
of classical internalism suggests. 
In fact the disjunctivist might well be skeptical that the classical internalist 
thinks that Al and Al* share the same evidence for no further reason at all (I mean 
beyond their merely ‘intuiting it’). Rather, as I’ll begin to describe in the next 
section, the disjunctivist might think that her internalist interlocutor is led to 
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choose sameness of evidence as the proper explanation for SOSI out of motivation 
to explain proper perceptual belief in a certain way. 
 
2.8  
 
In this section I have endeavoured to solve the first-order problem for 
disjunctivism, the first of the two problems comprising the NEG challenge for ED. 
Remember this was the question about how to explain a certain thought concerning 
you and your radically deceived counterpart—the NEG thought that your radically 
deceived counterpart is no less justified than you in believing as she does. I have 
conceived this thought in terms of ‘sameness of epistemic status’ (SOSI), and have 
sought to engage this problem in a way more satisfying than any to date. 
I have said that—beyond mere ‘epistemic blamelessness’—your radically 
deceived duplicate needn’t be any less trait-level virtuous nor less reasonable than 
you for believing as she does. This is consistent with your both differing in available 
evidence for your perceptual beliefs. Moreover, this is more satisfying than mere 
blamelessness explanations for two reasons. First, these statuses avoid unnecessary 
tangles in issues to do with epistemic deontology. It’s better that disjunctivists have 
a solution to the first-order problem that doesn’t seemingly commit them to the 
existence of bona fide epistemic duties. In general, one shouldn’t over-commit, or 
commit beyond what is necessary for dealing with a problem. Secondly, going 
beyond mere blamelessness permits the disjunctivist to properly distinguish 
between our radically deceived duplicates and other epistemic unfortunates such as 
Bert and Carl.  
 
3 Disjunctivism and the ‘Diagnostic’ Problem 
 
In this section I address the second of the two questions comprising the NEG 
challenge for ED: the ‘diagnostic’ question.  From SOSI the proponent of classical 
internalism draws the conclusion that evidential internalism is true, and thereby 
adopts the NEG thesis: that the evidence you have for your perceptual beliefs in 
the good case isn’t any better than the evidence your radically deceived counterpart 
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has in the bad case. Disjunctivists disagree that this is the lesson to be drawn from 
new evil genius considerations. Proponents of classical internalism should rather 
find their way to see that such subjects are equally well virtuous and reasonable in 
believing as they do, while differing in available evidence.  
But then why is the classical internalist prone to disagree with the 
disjunctivist in this way? Why is the proponent of classical internalism prone to 
think that it’s owing to you and your radically deceived counterpart sharing the 
same evidence that explains why we think they share some positive epistemic status 
(SOSI)? Even more importantly, why should this way of thinking be resisted? Why 
is it in error? This is the diagnostic problem for ED, which I address in this section. 
 
3.1 
 
I don’t think the classical internalist adopts a kind of sameness of evidence 
explanation for the thought at issue in SOSI motivated by nothing other than sheer 
intuition. Rather I suspect that there’s a deeper motivation for this choice of 
explanation. Moreover, I think there’s good reason to learn to resist this 
motivation—reason that the disjunctivist can use for supporting her error theory. 
Familiarly, internalists aim to explain how one is permitted to accept one’s 
basic perceptual beliefs by appeal to some kind of ‘rational support’. Evidentialists24 
among them think this is to be done by focusing on evidence: it’s one’s evidence 
that furnishes one’s rational support for belief. The task then is to settle on a 
picture of one’s available evidence or ‘reasons for belief’ which will explain how in 
general one is epistemically permitted to accept one’s perceptual beliefs on the basis 
of that evidence.  
Disjunctivist internalists explain that such rational support for perceptual 
belief is furnished in good cases by one’s seeing that p. Proponents of classical 
internalism, on the other hand, explain that one’s rational support is furnished in 
good cases by one’s merely seeming to see that p (or some such). 
Now any such theory of rational support for perceptual belief is evaluable in 
its capacity to explain perceptual knowledge either before or after one gets into a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24"See,"for"example,"Conee"and"Feldman"(2004)."
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certain mood. That is to say, either before or after one comes to ‘feel’ the need for 
a demonstration of the truth of perceptual beliefs through some non-question-
begging argument. Theories of rational support that are evaluated after one gets 
into this mood will be expected to explain our ‘permission’ to external world beliefs 
in a certain way. They’ll have to explain this permission by way of offering a kind of 
reassurance25 that one can be reconvinced of one’s access to the external world, 
even after one has been made to seriously doubt it. 
Such explanations belong to the so-called vindicatory project in 
epistemology, which is sometimes contrasted with the more modest explanatory 
project.26 
Classical internalists want theories of rational support that are capable of 
providing vindicating explanations of our purchase on the external world—
explanations which establish proper perceptual belief. Unless one’s theory of 
evidence or reasons for perceptual belief allows for some non-question-begging 
‘inference-like’ move to the external world from some consideration that isn’t yet a 
purchase on that world, such a theory will not be fit for purpose. 
Notice that disjunctivist theories of rational support are not fit for 
vindicatory purposes. Such theories hold that one’s rational support is furnished by 
one’s seeing that p—this is one’s evidence, or the bit of information one has to go 
on in forming one’s perceptual belief. That one sees that p is not fit to convince one 
that one has a purchase on the fact that p after one’s begun to seriously doubt 
this—not unless one finds question-begging arguments convincing (seeing that p is 
factive, after all, entailing that p).27 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25"Sandy"Goldberg"(forthcoming)"notes"that"the"classical"internalist"is"especially"concerned"
whether"“what"one"takes"to"be"adequate"epistemic"support"is)in)fact)no)such)thing”,"and"that"
“what"is"wanted"is"a"form"of"reassurance"in"the"face"of"this"worry.”"
"
26"See,"for"instance,"Greco"(2010,"5)."
"
27"Compare"this"comment"from"McDowell"(2002,"99–100):"“Of"course"one"does"not"inherit)
entitlement"to,"for"instance,"‘There’s"a"candle"in"front"of"me’"from"a"commitment—to"which"one"
would"have"to"be"entitled—to"‘I"see"that"there’s"a"candle"in"front"of"me’."One"could"not"be"entitled"
to"‘I"see"that"there’s"a"candle"in"front"of"me’"while"it"was"still"in"suspense"whether"one"was"entitled"
to"‘There’s"a"candle"in"front"of"me’—suspense"that"one"would"terminate,"on"this"impossible"
picture,"by"inferring"‘There’s"a"candle"in"front"of"me’"from"‘I"see"that"there’s"a"candle"in"front"of"
me.”"
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But evidentially internalist theories of rational support are fit for vindicatory 
purposes. Such theories hold out hope for explaining how it’s permissible for one to 
accept one’s perceptual beliefs so as to provide the relevant reassurance: that one 
could become reconvinced of one’s hold on the truth about some basic perceptual 
matter after assuming that one hasn’t as much.  
This is no unfamiliar commentary. But a less familiar point can be made 
concerning the stakes at issue for the classical internalist with respect to how she 
conceives rational support for perceptual belief.  
For unless she maintains her evidential internalism, thus standing by the 
NEG thesis (that one’s evidence or rational support in the good case is never any 
better than one’s rational support in the bad case), the classical internalist will be 
without a theory of rational support with which to work out a vindicating 
explanation of our epistemic permission to our basic perceptual beliefs. In such case 
the game would be up for the classical internalist, because the game would be up 
for the vindicatory project.28 
If she were to rescind on her evidential internalism about perceptual belief 
(by adopting disjunctivism, or the idea that E=K29, or whatever) she would be left 
without a theory of rational support that could explain proper perceptual belief by 
vindicating such belief. Factive mental states aren’t in the business of vindicating 
perceptual beliefs. 
In other words, there’s all the natural motivation in the world for the 
proponent of classical internalism to assume that it’s because you and your radically 
deceived counterpart share the same evidence (your ‘seeming seeings’) for your 
perceptual beliefs that we think that there’s some shared positive epistemic status 
between the two of you (SOSI). If she gave up this idea, after all, she would give up 
on the feature of classical internalism that is most distinctive of the view—viz., the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28"It’s"true"that"there’s"logical"space"for"rejecting"evidential"internalism"without"adopting"a"view"of"
rational"support"which"is"unfit"for"functioning"in"vindicatory"explanations"of"proper"perceptual"
belief."For"instance,"perhaps"one"then"adopts"some"form"of"evidential"externalism"on"which"one’s"
evidence"in"the"good"case"is"different)or"even"better)than"one’s"evidence"in"the"bad"case,"but"still"
falls"short"of"being"factive."While"there’s"logical"space"for"such"a"view,"I"can’t"imagine"what"it"
would"look"like,"or"how"it"might"be"motivated."
"
29"This"is"the"idea"that"your"evidence"equals"all"and"only"those"propositions"you"know"(see"
Williamson"(2000))."This"is"a"view"about"evidence"possession,"and"it"bears"complicated"and"
interesting"relations"to"disjunctivism"that"I"haven’t"time"to"discuss"here.""
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view’s perennial insistence on a vindicatory explanatory conception of basic 
perceptual knowledge. 
 
3.2 
 
It’s no news that the vindicatory project has fallen into disrepute in recent years. 
But that’s not as interesting for the disjunctivist’s diagnostic purposes as some good 
reason to think this is where the project belongs. A good diagnosis should include 
an error theory. Why is the classical internalist wrong to be swayed in her thinking 
about the new evil genius by the vindicatory project in epistemology? 
In the previous subsection, I argued that it’s entirely natural that the classical 
internalist assumes that it’s the fact that you and your radically deceived duplicate 
share all your evidence that explains why we are prone to think that she’s no less 
justified than you are. After all, if this is not the case, if we allow factive reasons 
through the door (which are incidentally unavailable to one in the bad case) then 
the rational support furnished by such evidence is not of the right cut to furnish 
vindicatory explanations of proper perceptual belief. 
In this subsection I’ll offer some considerations that I think are available to 
the disjunctivist for understanding why the classical internalist’s vindicatory motive 
for adopting evidential internalism, although perfectly natural, is ultimately 
misguided. 
The deepest problems with classical internalist views are familiar. Classical 
internalists seek a conception of rational support with which to furnish a 
vindicatory conception of our ‘epistemic right’ to our external worlds beliefs. But 
for these purposes they are constrained to adopt a picture of rational support on 
which the best information anyone ever has to go on is the sort of information one 
would have anyway, even if radically deceived. If fundamentally “how reality 
appears to us to be is our only guide to how it is” (to quote Dougherty (2014, 101)), 
the inevitable burden for the proponent of classical internalism is to explain why 
appearances should ever tell accurately of the world they represent. 
John McDowell (1995, 878) writes that “anyone who knows the dreary 
history of epistemology knows this hope is rather faint”. But I think the situation is 
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in fact much worse for the classical internalist. It’s not as though they might have 
some hope, which for inductive reasons is rather faint—rather I think they have no 
hope at all. Why is this? 
There seems to be in principle reason for thinking that the classical 
internalist will be unable to vindicate proper perceptual believing if this is to be on 
the basis of mere ‘seeming seeings’ or perceptual appearances. For consider that 
since the classical internalist begins her vindicatory program from information 
available anyway, even if radically deceived, she would have to admit that even the 
most inventive attempt at ‘establishing’ our epistemic right to accept our external 
world beliefs would be available from ‘within the vat’, as it were. Any such 
explanation of why it’s permissible, after all, for one to accept one’s basic perceptual 
beliefs will be an explanation one’s radically deceived brain-in-a-vat counterpart can 
put to use for vindicating her beliefs, as well.  
In this way, there’s no vindication to be had for our perceptual beliefs that 
doesn’t also vindicate the beliefs of our radically deceived counterparts. But then 
you might worry that this is a strange kind of vindication the classical internalist 
holds out hope for. Does this even have the potential to look anything like an 
epistemic permission to accept our basic perceptual beliefs, if the very same 
permission is granted to the beliefs of maximally ignorant persons?  
I suggest not. I suggest that you have no good reason to accept your 
perceptual beliefs so long as any such reason does just as well to permit the beliefs 
of maximally ignorant and radically epistemically doomed subjects. In fact I can’t 
understand how any such ‘legitimization’ of perceptual beliefs is worth caring about 
from the epistemic point of view.  
For these reasons I think the disjunctivist has good reason for thinking that 
the classical internalist vindicatory program has rightly fallen into disrepute. But 
now the disjunctivist has all she needs for responding to the diagnostic problem. 
The disjunctivist can diagnose the classical internalist’s disagreeing with her over 
SOSI as a matter of the classical internalist being led naturally but mistakenly by a 
kind of vindicatory conception of the purpose of theories of rational support for 
perceptual beliefs.30 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30"Thanks"to"an"anonymous"referee"for"helpful"comments"concerning"the"structure"of"this"section.""
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4 Conclusion 
 
The first-order problem and the diagnostic problem together constitute the NEG 
challenge for epistemological disjunctivism. In this paper I have endeavoured to 
respond to the NEG challenge on behalf of the disjunctivist. 
With respect to the first-order problem, I argued that disjunctivists leave 
themselves vulnerable to criticism until they say more than they have said so far 
about the beliefs of your radically deceived counterpart. Beyond mere epistemic 
blamelessness, I argued that the disjunctivist can be more specific about the sort of 
status shared among good case and bad case epistemic counterparts—viz., subjects 
in bad cases are no less trait-level virtuous, nor less reasonable for adopting their 
perceptual beliefs.  
But even with a satisfactory answer to the first-order question, a robust 
presentation of ED should include an answer to the diagnostic problem. What 
explains the disagreement between proponents of ED and classical internalists with 
respect to SOSI, and why are classical internalists mistaken to adopt a sameness of 
evidence explanation of new evil genius considerations? 
I argued that it’s quite natural for the proponents of classical internalism to 
take for granted the idea that your evidence is no better than that of your radically 
deceived counterpart—since they are committed to a certain vindicatory project in 
epistemology. Unless they adopt a strict evidential internalism about rational 
support, they haven’t a theory of rational support to use in a vindicatory 
explanation of proper perceptual belief. The vindicatory project is itself a mistake, 
however—bordering on the incoherent. Classical internalists would thus do well to 
see themselves away from it. But then it isn’t clear why they shouldn’t think that 
you and your radically deceived counterpart can share in trait-level virtue and 
reasonability while differing in evidential support. 
I conclude that there’s no insurmountable NEG challenge for 
epistemological disjunctivism.31 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!31!Many thanks to Adam Carter, Brent Madison, and Duncan Pritchard for helpful comments on 
earlier drafts. Thanks as well to an anonymous referee for Grazer Philosophische Studien. 
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